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An adversary, who could control the 3 relays in a circuit, could deanonymize Tor users.
 
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Adversaries watching both ends of a Tor circuit could identify users
 
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Tor exit nodes have been used in the past to collect sensitive information from unencrypted connections. Malicious exit nodes are regularly identified and removed from the Tor network. For an example, see <a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/09/security-expert-used-tor-to-collect-government-e-mail-passwords/">Ars Technica: Security expert used Tor to collect government e-mail passwords</a>.
 
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To learn more about what information is available to someone observing the different parts of a Tor circuit, see the interactive graphics at <a href="https://support.torproject.org/https/https-1/">Tor FAQ: Can exit nodes eavesdrop on communications?</a>.
 
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Pretend to be the destination server, a technique known as <i>machine-in-the-middle</i> attack (MitM). That is why you should pay even more attention to the security warnings in <i>Tor Browser</i>. If you get such a warning, use the [[New Identity|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#new-identity]] feature of <i>Tor Browser</i> to change exit node.
 
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Observe your traffic. That is why <i>Tor Browser</i> and Tails include tools to encrypt the connection between the exit node and the destination server, whenever possible.
 
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The exit node can:
 
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[[!img doc/anonymous_internet/tor/tor.svg size="600x" link="no" alt="A Tor connection goes through 3 relays with the last one establishing the actual connection to the final destination"]]
 
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Tor hides your location from destination servers, but it does not encrypt <i>all</i> your communication. The last relay of a Tor circuit, called the <i>exit node</i>, establishes the actual connection to the destination server. This last step can be unencrypted, for example, if you connect to a website using HTTP instead of HTTPS.
 
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Exit nodes can intercept traffic to the destination server
 
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Many websites ask you to solve a CAPTCHA or block access from the Tor network.
 
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Parental controls, Internet service providers, and countries with heavy censorship can identify and block connections to the Tor network that don't use Tor bridges.
 
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The sites that you visit can know that you are using Tor, because the <a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html">list of exit nodes of the Tor network</a> is public.
 
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Everything you do on the Internet from Tails goes through the Tor network.
 
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Tails makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails
 
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[[!inline pages="doc/about/warning/tor.inline" raw="yes" sort="age"]] [[!toc levels=2]]
 
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Limitations of Tor
 
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[[!meta title="Limitations of the Tor network"]]
 
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