To store files in your TailsUSB stick, use the [[Persistent Storage|doc/persistent_storage]]. To exchange files between Tails and another operating system, use a separate USB stick.
No. Upgrading whenever you get a notification from *[[Tails Upgrader|doc/upgrade]]* is enough.
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No.Tails provides upgrades every six4 weeks, thatwhich are thoroughly tested to make sure that no security feature or configuration gets broken. Updating add-ons in <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> might break the security built in Tails.
Our team sometimes publishes emergency releases, whenever important security upgrades are available in Debian or *Tor Browser* before the next scheduled release.
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It is notimpossible to verify the integrity of a Tailsdevice, USB stick or DVD, whilen running Tails from this same device. Thisit. It would be like asking to someone whether she is a liar; the answer ofthey are lying: a true liar would always be "no"pretend to tell the truth.
It is impossible to verify the integrity of a TailsUSB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking to someone whether they are lying: a true liar would always pretend to tell the truth.
Updating add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built in Tails.
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Fingerprinting websites, such as <https://panopticlicoveryourtracks.eff.org/>or <https://ip-check.info/>, try to retrieve as much information as possible from your browser to see if it can be used to identify you.
Fingerprinting websites, such as <https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/>, try to retrieve as much information as possible from your browser to see if it can be used to identify you.
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As explained in our documentation about [[the fingerprinting|doc/about/ of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity on the webby making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst all the users of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> (either in Tails or on other operating systems).
As explained in our documentation about [[the fingerprint of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity by making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst all the users of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> (either in Tails or on other operating systems).
With VPNs, the administrators of the VPN can knowUnlike Tor, VPNs don't provide strong anonymity because the VPN provider can see both where you are connecting from and where you are connecting to.