Exit Zen
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Tails is part of the [Tor Project](https://torproject.org/).
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See also our explanation about [[why does Tails use Tor|doc/anonymous_internet/tor/why#relationship]].
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<h2 id="dedicated-stick">Do I need a USB stick dedicated to Tails?</h2>
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This is not possible using the recommended installation methods. Tails is designed to be a live system running from a removable media: USB stick or DVD.
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<h2 id="unetbootin">Can I install Tails with UNetbootin, YUMI, Rufus, Ventoy, or another tool?</h2>
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No. Those installation methods are unsupported. They might not work at all, or worse: they might seem to work, but produce a USB stick that does *not* behave like Tails should. Follow the [[download and installation documentation|install]] instead.
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Tails provides upgrades every 4 weeks, which are thoroughly tested to make sure that no security feature or configuration gets broken.
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<h2 id="preinstalled">Can I buy a preinstalled Tails USB stick or DVD?</h2>
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If burned on a DVD, then this DVD would be outdated on the next release. This means after 4 weeks at most.
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If installed onto a USB stick, then it would be impossible to verify that the Tails on the USB stick is genuine. Trusting that a Tails USB stick is genuine should be based either on cryptographic verification or on personal trust (if you know someone you trust who can clone a Tails USB stick for you). But once Tails is installed on a USB stick it is not possible to use our cryptographic verification techniques anymore. Being able to trust your Tails USB stick is something that we really care about.
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<h2 id="integrity">Can I verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD?</h2>
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It is impossible to verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking to someone whether they are lying: a true liar would always pretend to tell the truth.
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<h1 id="browser">Tor Browser</h1>
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Many websites today require JavaScript to work correctly. As a consequence JavaScript is enabled by default in Tails to avoid confusing many users. But *Tor Browser* takes care of [[blocking dangerous JavaScript functionalities|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#javascript]].
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Tor Browser also includes a [[security level|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#security-level]] and the [[NoScript|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#noscript]] extension to optionally disable more JavaScript. This might improve security in some cases. However, if you disable JavaScript, then the [[fingerprint|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]] of your *Tor Browser* differs from most users. This reduces your anonymity.
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2. They can have bugs and security vulnerabilities that can be remotely exploited by an
attacker.
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3. They can have bugs breaking the security offered by other add-ons
and break your anonymity.
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Updating add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built in Tails.
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Fingerprinting websites, such as <https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/>, try to retrieve as much information as possible from your browser to see if it can be used to identify you.
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As explained in our documentation about
[[the fingerprint of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity by
making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst all the users of
<span class="application">Tor Browser</span> (either in Tails or on other operating systems).
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