Tails is part of the [Tor Project](https://torproject.org/).

See also our explanation about [[why does Tails use Tor|doc/anonymous_internet/tor/why#relationship]].

<h2 id="dedicated-stick">Do I need a USB stick dedicated to Tails?</h2>

This is not possible using the recommended installation methods. Tails is designed to be a live system running from a removable media: USB stick or DVD.

<h2 id="unetbootin">Can I install Tails with UNetbootin, YUMI, Rufus, Ventoy, or another tool?</h2>

No. Those installation methods are unsupported. They might not work at all, or worse: they might seem to work, but produce a USB stick that does *not* behave like Tails should. Follow the [[download and installation documentation|install]] instead.

Tails provides upgrades every 4 weeks, which are thoroughly tested to make sure that no security feature or configuration gets broken.

<h2 id="preinstalled">Can I buy a preinstalled Tails USB stick or DVD?</h2>

If burned on a DVD, then this DVD would be outdated on the next release. This means after 4 weeks at most.

If installed onto a USB stick, then it would be impossible to verify that the Tails on the USB stick is genuine. Trusting that a Tails USB stick is genuine should be based either on cryptographic verification or on personal trust (if you know someone you trust who can clone a Tails USB stick for you). But once Tails is installed on a USB stick it is not possible to use our cryptographic verification techniques anymore. Being able to trust your Tails USB stick is something that we really care about.

<h2 id="integrity">Can I verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD?</h2>

It is impossible to verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking to someone whether they are lying: a true liar would always pretend to tell the truth.

<h1 id="browser">Tor Browser</h1>

Many websites today require JavaScript to work correctly. As a consequence JavaScript is enabled by default in Tails to avoid confusing many users. But *Tor Browser* takes care of [[blocking dangerous JavaScript functionalities|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#javascript]].

Tor Browser also includes a [[security level|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#security-level]] and the [[NoScript|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#noscript]] extension to optionally disable more JavaScript. This might improve security in some cases. However, if you disable JavaScript, then the [[fingerprint|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]] of your *Tor Browser* differs from most users. This reduces your anonymity.

2. They can have bugs and security vulnerabilities that can be remotely exploited by an
attacker.

3. They can have bugs breaking the security offered by other add-ons
and break your anonymity.

Updating add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built in Tails.

Fingerprinting websites, such as <https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/>, try to retrieve as much information as possible from your browser to see if it can be used to identify you.

As explained in our documentation about
[[the fingerprint of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity by
making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst all the users of
<span class="application">Tor Browser</span> (either in Tails or on other operating systems).