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	Translation	Source string	Target string
	Tails/wiki/src/doc/about/warnings/tor.*.po — Chinese (Simplified Han script)	[[!meta title="Limitations of the Tor network"]]
	Tails/wiki/src/doc/about/warnings/tor.*.po — Italian	Limitations of Tor	Limiti della rete Tor
	Tails/wiki/src/doc/about/warnings/tor.*.po — Portuguese	Tor and Tails don't protect you by making you look like any random Internet user, but by making all Tor and Tails users look the same. It becomes impossible to know who is who among all users.	Quando Tor e Tails te protegem, não é fazendo você parecer um usuário aleatório de Internet, mas sim fazendo com que todos os usuários de Tor e Tails pareçam ser o mesmo. Assim torna-se impossível distinguir quem é quem entre esses usuários.
	Tails/wiki/src/doc/about/warnings/tor.*.po — Portuguese	Your Internet service provider (ISP) and local network can see that you connect to the Tor network. But, they cannot know which sites you visit. To also hide that you connect to Tor, use a [[Tor bridge|doc/anonymous_internet/tor]].	O seu provedor de serviço de internet e a sua rede local podem ver que você conecta à rede Tor. Ainda assim, não sabem quais sites você visita. Para esconder o fato de que você está usando Tor, use uma [[ponte Tor|doc/anonymous_internet/tor]].
	Tails/wiki/src/doc/about/warnings/tor.*.po — Spanish	[[!img doc/anonymous_internet/tor/tor.svg size="600x" link="no" alt="A Tor connection goes through 3 relays with the last one establishing the actual connection to the final destination"]]
	Tails/wiki/src/doc/about/warnings/tor.*.po — Spanish	Pretend to be the destination server, a technique known as <i>machine-in-the-middle</i> attack (MitM). That is why you should pay even more attention to the security warnings in <i>Tor Browser</i>. If you get such a warning, use the [[New Identity|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#new-identity]] feature of <i>Tor Browser</i> to change exit node.
	Tails/wiki/src/doc/about/warnings/tor.*.po — Portuguese	[[!img ssl_warning.png link="no" alt="Warning: Potential Security Risk Ahead"]]	[[!img ssl_warning.png link=no alt="Aviso: Potencial risco de segurança adiante"]]
	Tails/wiki/src/doc/about/warnings/tor.*.po — Spanish	To learn more about what information is available to someone observing the different parts of a Tor circuit, see the interactive graphics at <a href="https://support.torproject.org/https/https-1/">Tor FAQ: Can exit nodes eavesdrop on communications?</a>.
	Tails/wiki/src/doc/about/warnings/tor.*.po — Spanish	Tor exit nodes have been used in the past to collect sensitive information from unencrypted connections. Malicious exit nodes are regularly identified and removed from the Tor network. For an example, see <a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/09/security-expert-used-tor-to-collect-government-e-mail-passwords/">Ars Technica: Security expert used Tor to collect government e-mail passwords</a>.
	Tails/wiki/src/doc/about/warnings/tor.*.po — Italian	The Tor network has more than 6&#8239;000 relays. Organizations running Tor relays include universities like the MIT, activist groups like Riseup, nonprofits like Derechos Digitales, Internet hosting companies like Private Internet Access, and so on. The huge diversity of people and organizations running Tor relays makes it more secure and more sustainable.	La rete Tor conta più di 6&#8239;000 relè. Le organizzazioni che gestiscono i relè Tor includono università come il MIT, gruppi di attivisti come Riseup, organizzazioni non profit come Derechos Digitales, società di Internet hosting come Private Internet Access, ecc. L'enorme varietà di persone e organizzazioni che gestiscono i relè Tor lo rendono più sicuro e sostenibile.
	Tails/wiki/src/doc/about/warnings/tor.*.po — Spanish	A powerful adversary, who could analyze the timing and shape of the traffic entering and exiting the Tor network, might be able to deanonymize Tor users. These attacks are called <i>end-to-end correlation</i> attacks, because the attacker has to observe both ends of a Tor circuit at the same time.	Un adversario poderoso, que podría analizar el tiempo y la forma del tráfico que ingresa y sale de la red Tor, podría eliminar el anonimato de los usuarios de Tor. Estos ataques se denominan ataques de <i>correlación de extremo a extremo</i>, porque el atacante tiene que observar ambos extremos de un circuito Tor al mismo tiempo.
	Tails/wiki/src/doc/about/warnings/tor.*.po — Spanish	End-to-end correlation attacks have been studied in research papers, but we don't know of any actual use to deanonymize Tor users. For an example, see <a href="https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/murdoch-pet2007.pdf">Murdoch and Zieliński: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries</a>.