Your Internet service provider (ISP) and local network can see that you connect to the Tor network. They still cannot know what sites you visit.To hide that you connect to Tor, you can use a [[Tor bridges|first_steps/welcome_screen/bridge_mode|doc/anonymous_internet/tor]].
Your Internet service provider (ISP) and local network can see that you connect to the Tor network. They still cannot know what sites you visit.To hide that you connect to Tor, you can use a [[Tor bridge|doc/anonymous_internet/tor]].
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Tor hides your location from destination servers, but it does not encrypt <i>all</i> your communication. The last relay of a Tor circuit, called the <i>exit node</i>, establishes the actual connection to the destination server. This last step can be unencrypted, for example, if you connect to a website using HTTP instead of HTTPS.
Tor hides your location from destination servers, but it does not encrypt <i>all</i> your communication. The last relay of a Tor circuit, called the <i>exit node</i>, establishes the actual connection to the destination server. This last step can be unencrypted, for example, if you connect to a website using HTTP instead of HTTPS.
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[[!img htw2-tails.pngdoc/anonymous_internet/tor/tor.svg size="600x" link="no" alt="A Tor connection usuallygoes through 3 relays with the last one establishing the actual connection to the final destination"]]
[[!img doc/anonymous_internet/tor/tor.svg size="600x" link="no" alt="A Tor connection goes through 3 relays with the last one establishing the actual connection to the final destination"]]
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Observe your traffic. That is why <i>Tor Browser</i> and Tails include tools, like [[<i>HTTPS Everywhere</i>|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#https-everywhere]], to encrypt the connection between the exit node and the destination server, whenever possible.
Observe your traffic. That is why <i>Tor Browser</i> and Tails include tools to encrypt the connection between the exit node and the destination server, whenever possible.
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End-to-end correlation attacks have been studied in research papers, but we don't know of any actual use to deanonymize Tor users. For an example, see <a href="https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/murdoch-pet2007.pdf">Murdoch and Zieliński: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries</a>.
End-to-end correlation attacks have been studied in research papers, but we don't know of any actual use to deanonymize Tor users. For an example, see <a href="https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/murdoch-pet2007.pdf">Murdoch and Zieliński: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries</a>.
