For example, thanks to this confinement, even if an attacker manages to exploit a security vulnerability in *Tor Browser*, they wouldn't be able to access all the content of your Persistent Storage.
<p>In [[Tails 6.14.1|news/version_6.14.1]] (April 2025), we improved the previous confinement and you can now safely download to and read from any folder in your <i>Home</i> folder or Persistent Storage.</p>
This confinement relies on 2 security technologies: *[[!debwiki AppArmor]]* and the [XDG Desktop Portals](https://flatpak.github.io/xdg-desktop-portal/) of *Flatpak*.
It is impossible to hide to the websites that you visit that you are using Tor, because the [list of exit nodes of the Tornetwork is public](https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html).
The anonymity provided by *Tor Browser* works by making all users look the same to make it impossible to know who is who among the millions of users of *Tor Browser*.
Tails tries to make it as difficult as possible for websites to distinguish Tails users from other users of *Tor Browser*. If it was possible for a website to determine whether you are a user of *Tor Browser* inside or outside of Tails, this would provide a little bit more information about you and reduce your anonymity.
The websites that you visit can retrieve a lot of information about your browser, whether it's *Tor Browser* or a regular browser. This information is called the *fingerprint* of the browser and includes the name and version of the browser, the size of the window, the time zone, the available fonts, etc.
To make it difficult to distinguish Tails users from other users of *Tor Browser*, *Tor Browser* in Tails tries to provide the same information as *Tor Browser* on other operating systems.
Refer to the [[fingerprint section of our list of known issues |support/known_issues#fingerprint]] to know if there are differences between the fingerprints of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> inside and outside of Tails.
