For example, thanks to this confinement, even if an attacker manages to exploit a security vulnerability in *Tor Browser*, they wouldn't be able to access all the content of your Persistent Storage.
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<p>To prevent Tails from running out of memory and crashing, download very big files to the <emi>Persistent/Tor Browser</em</i> folder. All tThe files that you download outside of the Persistent Storage are stored in memory (RAM), which is more limited.</p>
<p>To prevent Tails from running out of memory and crashing, download very big files to the <i>Persistent</i> folder. The files that you download outside of the Persistent Storage are stored in memory (RAM), which is more limited.</p>
<p>In [[Tails 6.14.1|news/version_6.14.1]] (April 2025), we improved the previous confinement and you can now safely download to and read from any folder in your <i>Home</i> folder or Persistent Storage.</p>
This confinement relies on 2 security technologies: *[[!debwiki AppArmor]]* and the [XDG Desktop Portals](https://flatpak.github.io/xdg-desktop-portal/) of *Flatpak*.
It is impossible to hide to the websites that you visit that you are using Tor, because the [list of exit nodes of the Tornetwork is public](https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html).
The anonymity provided by *Tor Browser* works by making all users look the same to make it impossible to know who is who among the millions of users of *Tor Browser*.
Tails tries to make it as difficult as possible for websites to distinguish Tails users from other users of *Tor Browser*. If it was possible for a website to determine whether you are a user of *Tor Browser* inside or outside of Tails, this would provide a little bit more information about you and reduce your anonymity.
The websites that you visit can retrieve a lot of information about your browser, whether it's *Tor Browser* or a regular browser. This information is called the *fingerprint* of the browser and includes the name and version of the browser, the size of the window, the time zone, the available fonts, etc.