Tails/wiki/src/support/faq.*.po — Catalan @ Tails translation platform: <h2 id="javascript">Why is JavaScript enabled by default in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>

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	If you upgrade the system yourself using `apt` or Synaptic, you might break things.	Si actualitzeu el sistema amb `apt` o Synaptic, és possible que trenqueu coses.
	Our team sometimes publishes emergency releases, whenever important security upgrades are available in Debian or Tor Browser before the next scheduled release.	De vegades, el nostre equip publica versions d'emergència, sempre que hi hagi actualitzacions de seguretat importants disponibles a Debian o al Navegador Tor abans de la propera versió programada.
	<h2 id="preinstalled">Can I buy a preinstalled Tails USB stick or DVD?</h2>	<h2 id="preinstalled">Puc comprar un llapis USB o DVD amb Tails preinstal·lat?</h2>
	No, we don't sell preinstalled Tails devices.	No, no venem dispositius Tails preinstal·lats.
	Selling preinstalled devices would in fact be a pretty bad idea:	Vendre dispositius preinstal·lats seria de fet una molt mala idea:
	If burned on a DVD, then this DVD would be outdated on the next release. This means after 4 weeks at most.	Si es grava en un DVD, aquest DVD quedaria obsolet a la propera versió. Això vol dir després de quatre setmanes com a màxim.
	If installed onto a USB stick, then it would be impossible to verify that the Tails on the USB stick is genuine. Trusting that a Tails USB stick is genuine should be based either on cryptographic verification or on personal trust (if you know someone you trust who can clone a Tails USB stick for you). But once Tails is installed on a USB stick it is not possible to use our cryptographic verification techniques anymore. Being able to trust your Tails USB stick is something that we really care about.	Si s'instal·la en un llapis USB, seria impossible verificar que el Tails del llapis USB sigui autèntic. Confiar que un llapis USB de Tails és genuí s'hauria de basar en la verificació criptogràfica o en la confiança personal (si coneixeu algú de confiança que us pugui clonar un llapis USB de Tails). Però un cop instal·lat Tails en un llapis USB, ja no és possible utilitzar les nostres tècniques de verificació criptogràfica. Poder confiar en el vostre llapis USB de Tails és una cosa que ens importa molt.
	<h2 id="integrity">Can I verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD?</h2>	<h2 id="integrity">Puc verificar la integritat d'un llapis USB o DVD de Tails?</h2>
	It is impossible to verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking someone whether they are lying: a true liar would always pretend to tell the truth.	És impossible verificar la integritat d'un llapis USB o DVD de Tails mentre s'executa Tails des d'ell. Seria com preguntar a algú si menteix: un veritable mentider sempre fingiria dir la veritat.
	If you worry that your Tails might be corrupted, do a [[manual upgrade\|doc/upgrade]] from a trusted operating system to upgrade it to a trusted version of Tails.	Si us preocupa que el vostre Tails estigui malmès, feu una [[actualització manual\|upgrade]] des d'un sistema operatiu de confiança per actualitzar-lo a una versió de confiança de Tails.
	<div class="note">	<div class="note">
	<p>In the future, we might make it possible to verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick from another trusted OS. ([[!tails_ticket 7496]])</p>	<p>En el futur, intentarem fer possible verificar la integritat d'un llapis USB de Tails des d'un altre sistema operatiu de confiança. ([[!tails_ticket 7496]])</p>
	</div>	</div>
	<h1 id="browser">Tor Browser</h1>	<h1 id="browser">Navegador Tor</h1>
	<!-- We might move some of this content to the Tor Browser documentation. See #19122. -->	<!-- We might move some of this content to the Tor Browser documentation. See #19122. -->
	<h2 id="javascript">Why is JavaScript enabled by default in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>	<h2 id="javascript">Per què JavaScript està habilitat de manera predeterminada al <span class="application">Navegador Tor</span>?</h2>
	Many websites today require JavaScript to work correctly. As a consequence JavaScript is enabled by default in Tails to avoid confusing many users. But Tor Browser takes care of [[blocking dangerous JavaScript functionalities\|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#javascript]].	Actualment molts llocs web requereixen de JavaScript per funcionar correctament. Com a conseqüència, el JavaScript està habilitat per defecte a Tails per evitar confondre molts usuaris. Però el Navegador Tor s'encarrega de [[bloquejar les funcionalitats perilloses de JavaScript\|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#javascript]].
	Tor Browser also includes a [[security level\|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#security-level]] and the [[NoScript\|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#noscript]] extension to optionally disable more JavaScript. This might improve security in some cases. However, if you disable JavaScript, then the [[fingerprint\|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]] of your Tor Browser differs from most users. This reduces your anonymity.	El Navegador Tor també inclou un [[nivell de seguretat\|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#security-level]] i l'extensió [[NoScript\|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#noscript]] per desactivar opcionalment més JavaScript. Això pot millorar la seguretat en alguns casos. Tanmateix, si desactiveu JavaScript, aleshores l'[[empremta digital\|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]] del vostre Navegador Tor difereix de la majoria dels usuaris. Això redueix el vostre anonimat.
	We think that having JavaScript enabled by default is the best possible compromise between usability and security in this case.	Creiem que tenir el JavaScript activat per defecte és el millor compromís possible entre usabilitat i seguretat en aquest cas.
	<p>We have plans to allow storing the security level in the Persistent Storage. ([[!tails_ticket 9700]])</p>	<p>Tenim plans per permetre emmagatzemar el nivell de seguretat a l'Emmagatzematge Persistent. ([[!tails_ticket 9700]])</p>
	<h2 id="add-ons">Can I install other add-ons in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>	<h2 id="add-ons">Puc instal·lar altres complements al <span class="application">Navegador Tor</span>?</h2>
	Installing add-ons in Tor Browser might break the security built into Tails.	L'actualització de complements al Navegador Tor pot trencar la seguretat integrada a Tails.
	Add-ons can do many things within the browser, and even if all the networking goes through Tor, some add-ons might interact badly with the rest of the configuration or leak private information.	Els complements poden fer moltes coses al navegador i, fins i tot si tota la xarxa passa per Tor, alguns complements poden interactuar malament amb la resta de la configuració o filtrar informació privada.
	1. They can track and reveal information about your browsing behaviour, browsing history, or system information, either on purpose or by mistake.	1. Poden rastrejar i revelar informació sobre el vostre comportament de navegació, l'historial de navegació o la informació del sistema, ja sigui intencionadament o per error.
	2. They can have bugs and security vulnerabilities that can be remotely exploited by an attacker.	2. Poden tenir errors i vulnerabilitats de seguretat que poden ser explotades de forma remota per un atacant.
	3. They can have bugs that break the security offered by other add-ons and break your anonymity.	3. Poden tenir errors que trenquin la seguretat que ofereixen altres complements i trencar el vostre anonimat.
	4. They can break your anonymity by making your browsing behaviour distinguishable from other Tails users.	4. Poden trencar el vostre anonimat fent que el vostre comportament de navegació sigui distingible entre altres usuaris de Tails.
	Unless proven otherwise, no add-on, apart from the ones already included in Tails, has been seriously audited and should be considered safe to use in this context.	Llevat que es demostri el contrari, cap complement, a part dels que ja s'inclou a Tails, ha estat auditat seriosament i s'ha de considerar segur d'utilitzar en aquest context.
	<div class="next"> <ul> <li>[[Browsing the web with <i>Tor Browser</i>\|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser]]</li> </ul> </div>	<div class="next"> <ul> <li>[[Explorar el web amb el <span class="application">Navegador Tor</span>\|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser]]</li> </ul> </div>
	<!-- XXX: Push that information to the browser documentation? XXX: Check https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/torbutton/torbutton-faq.html.en#recommendedextensions -->	<!-- XXX: Push that information to the browser documentation? XXX: Check https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/torbutton/torbutton-faq.html.en#recommendedextensions -->
	<h2 id="update-add-ons">Should I manually update add-ons included in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>	<h2 id="update-add-ons">He d'actualitzar manualment els complements inclosos al <span class="application">Navegador Tor</span>?</h2>

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English	Catalan
JavaScript	JavaScript	Tails
Tor	Tor	Tails
Tor Browser	Navegador Tor	Tails

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wiki/src/support/faq.ca.po, string 62

Shortcut	Action
`?`	Open available keyboard shortcuts.
`Alt` + `Home`	Navigate to the first translation in the current search.
`Alt` + `End`	Navigate to the last translation in the current search.
`Alt` + `PageUp` or `Ctrl` + `↑` or `Alt` + `↑` or `Cmd` + `↑` or	Navigate to the previous translation in the current search.
`Alt` + `PageDown` or `Ctrl` + `↓` or `Alt` + `↓` or `Cmd` + `↓` or	Navigate to the next translation in the current search.
`Ctrl` + `Enter` or `Cmd` + `Enter`	Submit current form; this works the same as pressing Save and continue while editing translation.
`Ctrl` + `Shift` + `Enter` or `Cmd` + `Shift` +`Enter`	Unmark translation as Needing edit and submit it.
`Alt` + `Enter` or `Option` + `Enter`	Submit the string as a suggestion; this works the same as pressing Suggest while editing translation.
`Ctrl` + `E` or `Cmd` + `E`	Focus on translation editor.
`Ctrl` + `U` or `Cmd` + `U`	Focus on comment editor.
`Ctrl` + `M` or `Cmd` + `M`	Shows Automatic suggestions tab.
`Ctrl` + `1` to `Ctrl` + `9` or `Cmd` + `1` to `Cmd` + `9`	Copies placeable of a given number from source string.
`Ctrl` + `M` followed by `1` to `9` or `Cmd` + `M` followed by `1` to `9`	Copy the machine translation of a given number to current translation.
`Ctrl` + `I` followed by `1` to `9` or `Cmd` + `I` followed by `1` to `9`	Ignore one item in the list of failing checks.
`Ctrl` + `J` or `Cmd` + `J`	Shows the Nearby strings tab.
`Ctrl` + `S` or `Cmd` + `S`	Focus on search field.
`Ctrl` + `O` or `Cmd` + `O`	Copy the source string.
`Ctrl` + `Y` or `Cmd` + `Y`	Toggle the Needs editing checkbox.
`→`	Browse the next translation string.
`←`	Browse the previous translation string.

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