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Some years ago, you agreed to be part of a distributed mechanism for the revocation certificate of the Tails signing key and we sent you a cryptographic share of this revocation certificate.
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<pre>
Subject: update
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At least every 2 years, we make sure that the mechanism still works:
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Keep in mind that we could still revoke the signing key ourselves as long as three of us are able to communicate and gather their shares. So we only need your help if no more than two of us are still able to communicate.
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People on the list who are also convinced that the signing key should be revoked share their shares until they have 3 different shares. Then they can assemble the revocation certificate and publish it to revoke the signing key.
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<a id="invitation"></a>
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Covered by the current proposal:
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People in possession of a share of the revocation certificate of the signing key should have instructions on how to use it if needed.
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Someone hosting the mailing list is part of group B, C, or D so they can ensure that the list keeps working even if it never used.
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A. The signing key is not revoked when it should be. This could allow possible attackers to distribute malicious Tails images or publish malicious information on our name.
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We are proposing this to you because we trust in both your technical abilities to store your share in a safe place and manipulate it as required. But also because we trust you as a human being to make informed judgment on when to use your share and act only in the interest of Tails.
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B. The signing key is revoked when it should not have been. This would prevent people from verifying our images with OpenPGP until we publish a new signing key and build trust in it.
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The “wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.id.po” file was changed. 04/12/2019
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The “wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.zh_TW.po” file was changed. 03/04/2019
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The “wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.zh.po” file was changed. 03/04/2019
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The “wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.tr.po” file was changed. 03/04/2019
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The “wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.sr_Latn.po” file was changed. 03/04/2019
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The “wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.ru.po” file was changed. 03/04/2019
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The “wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.pt.po” file was changed. 03/04/2019
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The “wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.pl.po” file was changed. 03/04/2019

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