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<!--
XXX: Push that information to the browser documentation?
XXX: Check https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/torbutton/torbutton-faq.html.en#recommendedextensions
-->
 
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2. They can have bugs and security vulnerabilities that can be remotely exploited by an
attacker.
 
8 months ago
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1. They can track and reveal information about your browsing behaviour, browsing
history, or system information, either on purpose or by mistake.
 
8 months ago
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Add-ons can do many things within the browser, and even if all the networking goes through Tor, some add-ons might interact badly with the rest of the configuration or leak private information.
 
8 months ago
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<p>We have plans to allow storing the security level in the Persistent Storage. ([[!tails_ticket 9700]])</p>
 
8 months ago
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We think that having JavaScript enabled by default is the best possible compromise between usability and security in this case.
 
8 months ago
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Tor Browser also includes a [[security level|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#security-level]] and the [[NoScript|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#noscript]] extension to optionally disable more JavaScript. This might improve security in some cases. However, if you disable JavaScript, then the [[fingerprint|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]] of your *Tor Browser* differs from most users. This reduces your anonymity.
 
8 months ago
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Many websites today require JavaScript to work correctly. As a consequence JavaScript is enabled by default in Tails to avoid confusing many users. But *Tor Browser* takes care of [[blocking dangerous JavaScript functionalities|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#javascript]].
 
8 months ago
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<!-- We might move some of this content to the Tor Browser documentation. See #19122. -->
 
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<h1 id="browser">Tor Browser</h1>
 
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</div>
 
8 months ago
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<p>In the future, we might make it possible to verify the integrity of a Tails
USB stick from another trusted OS. ([[!tails_ticket 7496]])</p>
 
8 months ago
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<div class="note">
 
8 months ago
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<h2 id="integrity">Can I verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD?</h2>
 
8 months ago
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If installed onto a USB stick, then it would be impossible to verify that the Tails on the USB stick is genuine. Trusting that a Tails USB stick is genuine should be based either on cryptographic verification or on personal trust (if you know someone you trust who can clone a Tails USB stick for you). But once Tails is installed on a USB stick it is not possible to use our cryptographic verification techniques anymore. Being able to trust your Tails USB stick is something that we really care about.
 
8 months ago
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If burned on a DVD, then this DVD would be outdated on the next release. This means after 4 weeks at most.
 
8 months ago
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Selling preinstalled devices would in fact be a pretty bad idea:
 
8 months ago
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No, we don't sell preinstalled Tails devices.
 
8 months ago
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<h2 id="preinstalled">Can I buy a preinstalled Tails USB stick or DVD?</h2>
 
8 months ago
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Our team sometimes publishes emergency releases, whenever important security upgrades are available in Debian or *Tor Browser* before the next scheduled release.
 
8 months ago

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