None

Source string added
XXX: Copy the invitation email:
XXX: - Include "You can read a complete description of the distribution mechanism on:"
XXX: - Stop before "So, can we count on you for this?"
</pre>
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
We are also copying below a summary of the mechanism.
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
address@example.org
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
For the record, the address of the mailing list that you should write to in case you want to assemble the revocation certificate is:
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
The number NNN in the file name of your share.
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
The file was named tails-signing-key-revocation-cert.asc.NNN, where
NNN is a 3 digit number.
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
Your share of the revocation certificate.
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
Confirm whether you still have in your possession:
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
Some years ago, you agreed to be part of a distributed mechanism for the revocation certificate of the Tails signing key and we sent you a cryptographic share of this revocation certificate.
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
We asked someone else from your group to send you a copy of your share.
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
<pre>
Subject: sharing
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
Someone hosting the mailing list is part of group B, C, or D so they can ensure that the list keeps working even if it never used.
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
<a id="invitation"></a>
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
We are proposing this to you because we trust in both your technical abilities to store your share in a safe place and manipulate it as required. But also because we trust you as a human being to make informed judgment on when to use your share and act only in the interest of Tails.
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
A. The signing key is not revoked when it should be. This could allow possible attackers to distribute malicious Tails images or publish malicious information on our name.
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
B. The signing key is revoked when it should not have been. This would prevent people from verifying our images with OpenPGP until we publish a new signing key and build trust in it.
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
Covered by the current proposal:
06/22/2019
None

Source string added
People in possession of a share of the revocation certificate of the signing key should have instructions on how to use it if needed.
06/22/2019
None

Resource updated
The “wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.ar.po” file was changed. 03/04/2019
None

Resource updated
The “wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.ar.po” file was changed. 05/21/2018

Search