Using a public Tor relay as your first Tor relay makes it clear to your local
network that you are connecting to Tor, while still keeping your online
activity secure and anonymous.

Tor bridges are secret Tor relays that keep your connection to the Tor
network hidden.

Use a bridge as your first Tor relay if connecting to Tor is blocked or if
using Tor could look suspicious to someone who monitors your Internet
connection.

The technology used by Tor bridges is designed to circumvent censorship
where connections to Tor are blocked, for example in some countries with heavy censorship,
by some public networks, or by some parental controls.

It does so by camouflaging your connection so it cannot be recognized as a
connection to Tor. As a consequence, the same technology can be used to hide
that you are using Tor if it could look suspicious to someone who monitors
your Internet connection.

First, Tails synchronizes the clock of the computer automatically, because a correct time is needed to be able to connect to the Tor network.

Tails learns the current time by connecting to the captive portal detection
service of [Fedora](https://getfedora.org/), which is used by most Linux
distributions. This connection does not go through the Tor network and is an
exception to our policy of only making Internet connections through the Tor
network.

<p>You can learn more about our security assessment of this time
synchronization in our [[design documentation about non-Tor
traffic|contribute/design/Tor_enforcement#non-tor-traffic]].</p>

If you choose instead to [[hide that you are connecting to Tor|tor#hiding]],
you might have to fix the computer clock manually.

If Tails fails to synchronize the clock because you have to sign in to the network using a captive portal, an error screen is displayed that helps you do so.

For detailed instructions, see how to [[sign in to the network using a
captive portal|unsafe_browser]].

WThen you choose this option, Tails tries different ways of connecting to Tor until it succeeds:

Then, Tails tries different ways of connecting to Tor until it succeeds:

Tails tries to connect to Tor directly using **public relays**, without using a bridge.

Tails tries to connect to Tor using one of the **default bridges**, already included in Tails, if connecting using public relays fails.

<p>Tails uses the [[default <i>obfs4</i> bridges from <i>Tor
Browser</i>|https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/blob/main/projects/tor-expert-bundle/pt_config.json?ref_type=heads]].</p>

If public relays and default bridges don't work, Tails asks you to configure a **custom bridge**, if connecting using the default bridges fails.

You might need to go unnoticed if using Tor could look suspicious to someone who monitors your Internet connection.

<p>It is impossible to hide to the websites that you visit that you are using
Tor, because the <a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html">list
of exit nodes of the Tor network</a> is public.</p>

Our team is doing its best to help you connect to Tor using the most discreet types of Tor bridges. That is why, when you decide to hide that you are connecting to Tor:

Tails does not automatically detect whether you have to [[sign in to the network using a captive portal|unsafe_browser]].