Tor and Tails don't protect you by making you look like any random Internet user, but by making all Tor and Tails users look the same. It becomes impossible to know who is who among themall users.
Tor and Tails don't protect you by making you look like any random Internet user, but by making all Tor and Tails users look the same. It becomes impossible to know who is who among all users.
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Your Internet service provider (ISP) and local network can see that you connect to the Tor network. They stillBut, they cannot know whatich sites you visit.To alsohide that you connect to Tor,you can use a[[Tor bridges|first_steps/welcome_screen/bridge_mode|doc/anonymous_internet/tor]].
Your Internet service provider (ISP) and local network can see that you connect to the Tor network. But, they cannot know which sites you visit.To also hide that you connect to Tor, use a [[Tor bridge|doc/anonymous_internet/tor]].
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Tor hides your location from destination servers, but it does not encrypt <i>all</i> your communication. The last relay of a Tor circuit, called the <i>exit node</i>, establishes the actual connection to the destination server. This last step can be unencrypted, for example, if you connect to a website using HTTP instead of HTTPS.
Tor hides your location from destination servers, but it does not encrypt <i>all</i> your communication. The last relay of a Tor circuit, called the <i>exit node</i>, establishes the actual connection to the destination server. This last step can be unencrypted, for example, if you connect to a website using HTTP instead of HTTPS.
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[[!img htw2-tails.pngdoc/anonymous_internet/tor/tor.svg size="600x" link="no" alt="A Tor connection usuallygoes through 3 relays with the last one establishing the actual connection to the final destination"]]
[[!img doc/anonymous_internet/tor/tor.svg size="600x" link="no" alt="A Tor connection goes through 3 relays with the last one establishing the actual connection to the final destination"]]
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Observe your traffic. That is why <i>Tor Browser</i> and Tails include tools, like [[<i>HTTPS Everywhere</i>|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#https-everywhere]], to encrypt the connection between the exit node and the destination server, whenever possible.
Observe your traffic. That is why <i>Tor Browser</i> and Tails include tools to encrypt the connection between the exit node and the destination server, whenever possible.
The Tor network has more than 6 000 relays. Organizations running Tor relays include universities like the MIT, activist groups like Riseup, nonprofits like Derechos Digitales, Internet hosting companies like Private Internet Access, and so on. The huge diversity of people and organizations running Tor relays makes it more secure and more sustainable.
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End-to-end correlation attacks have been studied in research papers, but we don't know of any actual use to deanonymize Tor users. For an example, see <a href="https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/murdoch-pet2007.pdf">Murdoch and Zieliński: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries</a>.
End-to-end correlation attacks have been studied in research papers, but we don't know of any actual use to deanonymize Tor users. For an example, see <a href="https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/murdoch-pet2007.pdf">Murdoch and Zieliński: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries</a>.