[Tails is part of the [Tor Project: FAQ](https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en).

Tails is part of the [Tor Project](https://torproject.org/).

See also our explanation about [[why does Tails use Tor|doc/anonymous_internet/tor/why#relationship]].

See also our explanation about [[why does Tails use Tor|doc/anonymous_internet/tor/why#relationship]].

We are actively working on addimproving [[AppArmor|blueprint/Mandatory_Access_Control]] support to support|contribute/design/application_isolation]] in Tails; a security framework that is already used in a few Ubuntu applications.

We are actively working on improving [[AppArmor support|contribute/design/application_isolation]] in Tails; a security framework that is already used in a few Ubuntu applications.

Is Java installed in the Tor browser?
---------------------------------------<h2 id="dedicated-stick">Do I need a USB stick dedicated to Tails?</h2>

<h2 id="dedicated-stick">Do I need a USB stick dedicated to Tails?</h2>

<h2 id="permanent-installunetbootin">Can I install Tails permanently onto my hard diskwith UNetbootin, YUMI, Rufus, Ventoy, or another tool?</h2>

<h2 id="unetbootin">Can I install Tails with UNetbootin, YUMI, Rufus, Ventoy, or another tool?</h2>

Can I install other add-ons in the browser?<h2 id="upgrade">Should I update Tails using <code>apt upgrade</code> or <i>Synaptic</i>?</h2>

<h2 id="upgrade">Should I update Tails using <code>apt upgrade</code> or <i>Synaptic</i>?</h2>

Can I verify the integrity of a Tails device?<h2 id="preinstalled">Can I buy a preinstalled Tails USB stick or DVD?</h2>

<h2 id="preinstalled">Can I buy a preinstalled Tails USB stick or DVD?</h2>

<h2 id="integrity">Can I verify the integrity of a Tails device?USB stick or DVD?</h2>

<h2 id="integrity">Can I verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD?</h2>

It is not impossible to verify the integrity of a Tails device when running Tails from this same device. ThisUSB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking to someone whether she is a liar; the answer ofthey are lying: a true liar would always be "no"pretend to tell the truth.

It is impossible to verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking to someone whether they are lying: a true liar would always pretend to tell the truth.

Many websites today require JavaScript to work correctly. As a consequence JavaScript is enabled by default in Tails to avoid confusing many users. But the [[Torbutton|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#torbutton]] extension, included in Tails,*Tor Browser* takes care of [[blocking dangerous JavaScript functionalities|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#javascript]].

Many websites today require JavaScript to work correctly. As a consequence JavaScript is enabled by default in Tails to avoid confusing many users. But *Tor Browser* takes care of [[blocking dangerous JavaScript functionalities|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#javascript]].

Tailsor Browser also includes a [[security level|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#security-level]] and the [[NoScript|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#noscript]] extension to optionally disable more JavaScript. This might improve security in some cases. However, if you disable JavaScript, then the [[fingerprint|doc/about/nonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]] of your b*Tor Browser will* differs from most Tor users. This might breakreduces your anonymity.

Tor Browser also includes a [[security level|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#security-level]] and the [[NoScript|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#noscript]] extension to optionally disable more JavaScript. This might improve security in some cases. However, if you disable JavaScript, then the [[fingerprint|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]] of your *Tor Browser* differs from most users. This reduces your anonymity.

<h2 id="add-ons">Can I install other add-ons in the browser?<span class="application">Tor Browser</span>?</h2>

<h2 id="add-ons">Can I install other add-ons in <span class="application">Tor Browser</span>?</h2>

Installing add-ons in the browser<span class="application">Tor Browser</span> might break the security built in Tails.

Installing add-ons in <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> might break the security built in Tails.

2. They can have bugs and security holvulnerabilities that can be remotely exploited by an
attacker.

2. They can have bugs and security vulnerabilities that can be remotely exploited by an
attacker.

<div class="next">
<ul>
<li>[[Warnings about persistence|doc/first_steps/persistence/warnings#index3h1]]</li>
<li>[[Browsing the web with Iceweasel|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser]]</li>
<li>[[Can I hide the fact that I am using Tails?|doc/about/fingerprint/Browsing the web with <span class="application">Tor Browser</span>|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser]]</li>
</ul>
</div>

<div class="next">
<ul>
<li>[[Browsing the web with <span class="application">Tor Browser</span>|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser]]</li>
</ul>
</div>

Can I install other add-ons in the browser?<h2 id="update-add-ons">Should I manually update add-ons included in <span class="application">Tor Browser</span>?</h2>

<h2 id="update-add-ons">Should I manually update add-ons included in <span class="application">Tor Browser</span>?</h2>

InstallUpdating add-ons in the b*Tor Browser* might break the security built in Tails.

Updating add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built in Tails.

Fingerprinting websites, such as <https://panopticlicoveryourtracks.eff.org/> or <https://ip-check.info/>, try to retrieve as much information as possible from your browser to see if it can be used to identify you.

Fingerprinting websites, such as <https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/>, try to retrieve as much information as possible from your browser to see if it can be used to identify you.

As explained in our documentation about
[[the fingerprinting|doc/about/ of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity on the web by
making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst all the users of Tails and the Tor Browser Bundle (TBB
<span class="application">Tor Browser</span> (either in Tails or on other operating systems).

As explained in our documentation about
[[the fingerprint of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity by
making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst all the users of
<span class="application">Tor Browser</span> (either in Tails or on other operating systems).

So, the information retrieved by such fingerprinting websites is not harmful for
anonymity in itself, as long as it is the same for all Tor users.users of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span>.

So, the information retrieved by such fingerprinting websites is not harmful for
anonymity in itself, as long as it is the same for all users of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span>.