[Tails is part of the [Tor Project: FAQ](https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en).

Tails is part of the [Tor Project](https://torproject.org/).

See also our explanation about [[why does Tails uses Tor|doc/anonymous_internet/tor/why#relationship]].

See also our explanation about [[why Tails uses Tor|doc/anonymous_internet/tor/why#relationship]].

- The rapid development cycle of Ubuntu would be too fast for Tails.

The rapid development cycle of Ubuntu would be too fast for Tails.

Ubuntu adds features in ways that we find dangerous for privacy. For an example Ubuntu One ([partly discontinued](http://blog.canonical.com/2014/04/02/shutting-down-ubuntu-one-file-services/)) and the [, see [EFF: Privacy in Ubuntu 12.10, Amazon aAds and dData lLeaks](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/privacy-ubuntu-1210-amazon-ads-and-data-leaks).

Ubuntu adds features in ways that we find dangerous for privacy. For an example, see [EFF: Privacy in Ubuntu 12.10, Amazon Ads and Data Leaks](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/privacy-ubuntu-1210-amazon-ads-and-data-leaks).

<h2 id="permanent-installunetbootin">Can I install Tails permanently onto my hard diskwith UNetbootin, YUMI, Ventoy, or another tool?</h2>

<h2 id="unetbootin">Can I install Tails with UNetbootin, YUMI, Ventoy, or another tool?</h2>

Can I install other add-ons in the browser?<h2 id="upgrade">Should I update Tails using <code>apt upgrade</code> or <i>Synaptic</i>?</h2>

<h2 id="upgrade">Should I update Tails using <code>apt upgrade</code> or <i>Synaptic</i>?</h2>

It is not impossible to verify the integrity of a Tails device when running Tails from this same device. ThisUSB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking to someone whether she is a liar; the answer ofthey are lying: a true liar would always be "no"pretend to tell the truth.

It is impossible to verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking someone whether they are lying: a true liar would always pretend to tell the truth.

<h2 id="javascript">Why is JavaScript enabled by default in <span class="application"i>Tor Browser</spani>?</h2>

<h2 id="javascript">Why is JavaScript enabled by default in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>

<h2 id="add-ons">Can I install other add-ons in the browser?<i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>

<h2 id="add-ons">Can I install other add-ons in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>

Installing add-ons in the b*Tor Browser* might break the security built into Tails.

Installing add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built into Tails.

3. They can have bugs that breaking the security offered by other add-ons
and break your anonymity.

3. They can have bugs that break the security offered by other add-ons
and break your anonymity.

4. They can break your anonymity by making your browsing behaviour
distinguishable amongstfrom other Tails users.

4. They can break your anonymity by making your browsing behaviour
distinguishable from other Tails users.

Unless proven otherwise, no add-on, apart from the ones already included in Tails, haves been seriously audited and should be considered safe to use in this context.

Unless proven otherwise, no add-on, apart from the ones already included in Tails, has been seriously audited and should be considered safe to use in this context.

<div class="next">
<ul>
<li>[[Warnings about persistence|doc/first_steps/persistence/warnings#index3h1]]</li>
<li>[[Browsing the web with Iceweasel<i>Tor Browser</i>|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser]]</li>
<li>[[Can I hide the fact that I am using Tails?|doc/about/fingerprint/]]</li>
</ul>
</div>

<div class="next">
<ul>
<li>[[Browsing the web with <i>Tor Browser</i>|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser]]</li>
</ul>
</div>

Can I install other add-ons in the browser?<h2 id="update-add-ons">Should I manually update add-ons included in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>

<h2 id="update-add-ons">Should I manually update add-ons included in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>

InstallUpdating add-ons in the b*Tor Browser* might break the security built into Tails.

Updating add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built into Tails.

As explained in our documentation about [[the fingerprinting|doc/about/ of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity on the web by making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst all the users of Tails and the Tor Browser Bundle (TBByou from other users of *Tor Browser* (either in Tails or on other operating systems).

As explained in our documentation about [[the fingerprint of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity by making it difficult to distinguish you from other users of *Tor Browser* (either in Tails or on other operating systems).

So, the information retrieved by such fingerprinting websites is not harmful for anonymity in itself, as long as it is the same for all Tor usersusers of *Tor Browser*.

So, the information retrieved by such fingerprinting websites is not harmful for anonymity in itself, as long as it is the same for all users of *Tor Browser*.

<h2 id="htp">Why does Tails automatically connect to several websites when starting?</h2>

<h2 id="htp">Why does Tails automatically connect to websites when starting?</h2>

UsBeing a VPNble to connect to Tor (VPN before Tor)the Tor network.

Being able to connect to the Tor network.