We are deeply rooted and involved in Debian. The friendships, relationships, and technical expertise we have in Debian have many benefits for Tails, and we are not ready to build the same relationship with Ubuntu, OpenBSD, or any other distribution. See our statement about our [[contribute/relationship_with_upstream]] for details.

See also the article [Why there are so many Debian derivatives](http://upsilon.cc/~zack/blog/posts/2011/09/why_there_are_so_many_debian_derivatives/) by Stefano Zacchiroli.

We usually ship kernels and video drivers from [Debian backports](http://backports.debian.org/). The result is comparable to Ubuntu in terms of support for recent hardware.

We think that the general quality of the maintenance work being done on packages matters from a security perspective. Debian maintainers generally are experts in the fields their packages deal with; while it is generally not the case outside of the limited number of packages Ubuntu officially supports.

Doing relatively good regardingwell in terms of accessibility features.

Doing relatively well in terms of accessibility features

This is not possible using the recommended installation methods. Tails is designed to be a live system running from a removable media: USB stick or DVD.

Tails provides upgrades every 42 weeks, which are thoroughly tested to make sure that no security feature or configuration gets broken.

Tails provides upgrades every 2 weeks, which are thoroughly tested to make sure that no security feature or configuration gets broken.

<h2 id="preinstalled">Can I buy a preinstalled Tails USB stick or DVD?</h2>

No, we don't sell preinstalled Tails devices.

Selling preinstalled devices would in fact be a pretty bad idea:

If burned on a DVD, then this DVD would be outdated on the next release. This means after 42 weeks at most.

If burned on a DVD, then this DVD would be outdated on the next release. This means after 2 weeks at most.

It is impossible to verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking to someone whether they are lying: a true liar would always pretend to tell the truth.

It is impossible to verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking someone whether they are lying: a true liar would always pretend to tell the truth.

Many websites today require JavaScript to work correctly. As a consequence JavaScript is enabled by default in Tails to avoid confusing many users. But *Tor Browser* takes care of [[blocking dangerous JavaScript functionalities|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#javascript]].

Tor Browser also includes a [[security level|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#security-level]] and the [[NoScript|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#noscript]] extension to optionally disable more JavaScript. This might improve security in some cases. However, if you disable JavaScript, then the [[fingerprint|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]] of your *Tor Browser* differs from most users. This reduces your anonymity.

2. They can have bugs and security vulnerabilities that can be remotely exploited by an
attacker.

3. They can have bugs that breaking the security offered by other add-ons
and break your anonymity.

3. They can have bugs that break the security offered by other add-ons
and break your anonymity.

4. They can break your anonymity by making your browsing behaviour
distinguishable amongstfrom other Tails users.

4. They can break your anonymity by making your browsing behaviour
distinguishable from other Tails users.

Unless proven otherwise, no add-on, apart from the ones already included in Tails, haves been seriously audited and should be considered safe to use in this context.

Unless proven otherwise, no add-on, apart from the ones already included in Tails, has been seriously audited and should be considered safe to use in this context.

<h2 id="update-add-ons">Should I manually update add-ons included in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>

Updating add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built into Tails.

Updating add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built into Tails.