Ubuntu adds features in ways that we find dangerous for privacy. For anexampleUbuntu One ([partly discontinued](http://blog.canonical.com/2014/04/02/shutting-down-ubuntu-one-file-services/))and the [, see [EFF: Privacy in Ubuntu 12.10,Amazon aAds and dData lLeaks](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/privacy-ubuntu-1210-amazon-ads-and-data-leaks).
Ubuntu adds features in ways that we find dangerous for privacy. For an example, see [EFF: Privacy in Ubuntu 12.10, Amazon Ads and Data Leaks](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/privacy-ubuntu-1210-amazon-ads-and-data-leaks).
28
Doing relatively good regardingwell in terms of accessibility features.
Doing relatively well in terms of accessibility features
55
It is impossible to verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking tosomeone whether they are lying: a true liar would always pretend to tell the truth.
It is impossible to verify the integrity of a TailsUSB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking someone whether they are lying: a true liar would always pretend to tell the truth.
72
3. They can have bugs thatbreaking the security offered by other add-ons and break your anonymity.
4. They can break your anonymity by making your browsing behaviour distinguishable from other Tailsusers.
74
Unless proven otherwise, no add-on, apart from the ones already included in Tails, haves been seriously audited and should be considered safe to use in this context.
Unless proven otherwise, no add-on, apart from the ones already included in Tails, has been seriously audited and should be considered safe to use in this context.
79
Updating add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built into Tails.
Updating add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built into Tails.
82
As explained in our documentation about [[the fingerprint of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity by making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst allyou from other users of *Tor Browser* (either in Tails or on other operating systems).
As explained in our documentation about [[the fingerprint of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity by making it difficult to distinguish you from other users of *Tor Browser* (either in Tails or on other operating systems).
105
The clock of the computer needs to be set at the correct time tofor both:
The computer clock is fixed a second time, precisely, to prevent a website from identifying you by analyzing minor differences ofbetween your computer clock withand the correct time.
The computer clock is fixed a second time, precisely, to prevent a website from identifying you by analyzing minor differences between your computer clock and the correct time.
129
To check whether asome software is in Debian, search for it on <https://packages.debian.org/>. If it is not yet available in Debian,you should ask its developers why it is not the case yet.
To check whether some software is in Debian, search for it on <https://packages.debian.org/>. If it is not yet available in Debian, ask its developers why it is not the case yet.
164
There are 2 problems with using BitTorrent over Toris double: