[Tails is part of the [Tor Project: FAQ](https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en).

Tails is part of the [Tor Project](https://torproject.org/).

See also our explanation about [[why does Tails use Tor|doc/anonymous_internet/tor/why#relationship]].

See also our explanation about [[why does Tails use Tor|doc/anonymous_internet/tor/why#relationship]].

- The rapid development cycle of Ubuntu would be too fast for Tails.

The rapid development cycle of Ubuntu would be too fast for Tails.

- Well integrated, especially for new Linux users.

Well integrated, especially for new Linux users.

- Very well translated and documented.

Very well translated and documented.

- Doing relatively good regarding accessibility features.

Doing relatively good regarding accessibility features.

- Actively developed.

Actively developed.

<h2 id="dedicated-stick">Do I need a USB stick dedicated to Tails?</h2>

<h2 id="unetbootin">Can I install Tails with UNetbootin, YUMI, Ventoy, or another tool?</h2>

No. Tails provides upgrades every six4 weeks, thatwhich are thoroughly tested
to make sure that no security feature or configuration gets broken.
Updating add-ons in <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> might
break the security built in Tails.

Tails provides upgrades every 4 weeks, which are thoroughly tested to make sure that no security feature or configuration gets broken.

It is impossible to verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking to someone whether they are lying: a true liar would always pretend to tell the truth.

<h2 id="javascript">Why is JavaScript enabled by default in <span class="application"i>Tor Browser</spani>?</h2>

<h2 id="javascript">Why is JavaScript enabled by default in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>

Tor Browser also includes a [[security level|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#security-level]] and the [[NoScript|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#noscript]] extension to optionally disable more JavaScript. This might improve security in some cases. However, if you disable JavaScript, then the [[fingerprint|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]] of your *Tor Browser* differs from most users. This reduces your anonymity.

<h2 id="add-ons">Can I install other add-ons in <span class="application"i>Tor Browser</spani>?</h2>

<h2 id="add-ons">Can I install other add-ons in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>

Installing add-ons in <span class="application">*Tor Browser</span>* might break the security built in Tails.

Installing add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built in Tails.

<h2 id="update-add-ons">Should I manually update add-ons included in <span class="application"i>Tor Browser</spani>?</h2>

<h2 id="update-add-ons">Should I manually update add-ons included in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>

InstallUpdating add-ons in <span class="application">*Tor Browser</span>* might break the security built in Tails.

Updating add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built in Tails.

As explained in our documentation about [[the fingerprint of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity by making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst all the users of *Tor Browser* (either in Tails or on other operating systems).

Currently, Tails does not work with VPNs.

Unlike Tor, VPNs don't provide strong anonymity because the VPN provider can see both where you are connecting from and where you are connecting to.