<h1 id="project">Tails project</h1>

Tails is part of the [Tor Project](https://torproject.org/).

<h1 id="installation">Installation</h1>

<h2 id="dedicated-stick">Do I need a USB stick dedicated to Tails?</h2>

Tails provides upgrades every 4 weeks, which are thoroughly tested to make sure that no security feature or configuration gets broken.

<h2 id="preinstalled">Can I buy a preinstalled Tails USB stick or DVD?</h2>

Selling preinstalled devices would in fact be a pretty bad idea:

<h2 id="integrity">Can I verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD?</h2>

<h1 id="browser">Tor Browser</h1>

<h2 id="javascript">Why is JavaScript enabled by default in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>

<h2 id="add-ons">Can I install other add-ons in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>

Installing add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built in Tails.

<div class="next">
<ul>
<li>[[Browsing the web with <i>Tor Browser</i>|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser]]</li>
</ul>
</div>

<h2 id="update-add-ons">Should I manually update add-ons included in <i>Tor Browser</i>?</h2>

Updating add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built in Tails.

As explained in our documentation about [[the fingerprint of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity by making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst all the users of *Tor Browser* (either in Tails or on other operating systems).

So, the information retrieved by such fingerprinting websites is not harmful for anonymity in itself, as long as it is the same for all users of *Tor Browser*.

For example, the user-agent string of *Tor Browser* includes
<em>Windows NT</em> but this value preserves your anonymity even if
you run Windows NT. On the other hand, changing this value makes you distinguishable from
other users of *Tor Browser* and, as a
consequence, weakens your anonymity.

<h2 id="htp">Why does Tails automatically connect to websites when starting?</h2>

This second synchronization is made by sending HTTPS queries through Tor to several
websites and deducing a correct time from their answers. You can see the
list of websites that Tails can connect to in *[[!tails_gitweb config/chroot_local-includes/etc/default/htpdate.pools desc="/etc/default/htpdate.pools"]]*.