As explained in our documentation about [[the fingerprint of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity by making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst all the users of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> (either in Tails or on other operating systems).
So, the information retrieved by such fingerprinting websites is not harmful for anonymity in itself, as long as it is the same for all users of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span>.
For example, the user-agent string of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> includes <em>Windows NT</em> but this value preserves your anonymity even if you run Windows NT. On the other hand, changing this value makes you distinguishable from other users of <span class="application">Tor Browser</span> and, as a consequence, weakens your anonymity.
This second synchronization is made by sending HTTPS queries through Tor to several websites and deducing a correct time from their answers. You can see the list of websites that Tails can connect to in *[[!tails_gitweb config/chroot_local-includes/etc/default/htpdate.pools desc="/etc/default/htpdate.pools"]]*.
<p>If a software is not included in Tails, but is included in Debian, you can use the [[Additional Software|doc/persistent_storage/configure#additional_software]] feature of the Persistent Storage to install it automatically every time you start Tails.</p>