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msgid "[[!meta title=\"Limitations of the Tor network\"]]" msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

msgid "Limitations of Tor" msgstr "" #. type: Content of:
msgid "" "[[!inline pages=\"doc/about/warning/tor.inline\" raw=\"yes\" sort=\"age\"]] " "[[!toc levels=2]]" msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

msgid "Tails makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails" msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

msgid "" "Everything you do on the Internet from Tails goes through the Tor network." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

msgid "" "Tor and Tails don't protect you by making you look like any random Internet " "user, but by making all Tor and Tails users look the same. It becomes " "impossible to know who is who among all users." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

  • msgid "" "Your Internet service provider (ISP) and local network can see that you " "connect to the Tor network. But, they cannot know which sites you visit. To " "also hide that you connect to Tor, use a " "[[Tor bridge|doc/anonymous_internet/tor]]." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

    • msgid "" "The sites that you visit can know that you are using Tor, because the list of exit nodes " "of the Tor network is public." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

      msgid "" "Parental controls, Internet service providers, and countries with heavy " "censorship can identify and block connections to the Tor network that don't " "use Tor bridges." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

      msgid "" "Many websites ask you to solve a CAPTCHA or block access from the Tor " "network." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

      msgid "Exit nodes can intercept traffic to the destination server" msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

      msgid "" "Tor hides your location from destination servers, but it does not encrypt " "all your communication. The last relay of a Tor circuit, called the " "exit node, establishes the actual connection to the destination " "server. This last step can be unencrypted, for example, if you connect to a " "website using HTTP instead of HTTPS." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: outside any tag (error?) msgid "" "[[!img doc/anonymous_internet/tor/tor.svg size=\"600x\" link=\"no\" alt=\"A " "Tor connection goes through 3 relays with the last one establishing the " "actual connection to the final destination\"]]" msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

      msgid "The exit node can:" msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

      • msgid "" "Observe your traffic. That is why Tor Browser and Tails include tools " "to encrypt the connection between the exit node and the destination server, " "whenever possible." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

        • msgid "" "Pretend to be the destination server, a technique known as machine-in-the-" "middle attack (MitM). That is why you should pay even more attention to " "the security warnings in Tor Browser. If you get such a warning, use " "the [[New Identity|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#new-identity]] feature " "of Tor Browser to change exit node." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

            msgid "" "[[!img ssl_warning.png link=\"no\" alt=" "\"Warning: Potential Security Risk Ahead\"]]" msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

            msgid "" "To learn more about what information is available to someone observing the " "different parts of a Tor circuit, see the interactive graphics at [[Tor " "Support: How HTTPS encryption and Tor works in Tor Browser to enhance your " "privacy and anonymity|https://support.torproject.org/about-tor/security/" "https-encryption-and-tor/]]." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

            msgid "" "Tor exit nodes have been used in the past to collect sensitive information " "from unencrypted connections. Malicious exit nodes are regularly identified " "and removed from the Tor network. For an example, see Ars " "Technica: Security expert used Tor to collect government e-mail " "passwords." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

            msgid "Adversaries watching both ends of a Tor circuit could identify users" msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

            msgid "" "An adversary, who could control the 3 relays in a circuit, could deanonymize " "Tor users." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

            msgid "" "Tor chooses 3 relays that belong to 3 different network operators for each " "circuit." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

            msgid "" "Tails takes extra measures to [[use different circuits for different " "applications|contribute/design/stream_isolation]]." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

            msgid "" "The Tor network has more than 6 000 relays. Organizations running Tor " "relays include universities like the MIT, activist groups like Riseup, " "nonprofits like Derechos Digitales, Internet hosting companies like Private " "Internet Access, and so on. The huge diversity of people and organizations " "running Tor relays makes it more secure and more sustainable." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

            msgid "" "A powerful adversary, who could analyze the timing and shape of the traffic " "entering and exiting the Tor network, might be able to deanonymize Tor " "users. These attacks are called end-to-end correlation attacks, " "because the attacker has to observe both ends of a Tor circuit at the same " "time." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

            msgid "" "No anonymity network used for rapid connections, like browsing the web or " "instant messaging, can protect 100% from end-to-end correlation attacks. In " "this case, VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) are less secure than Tor, because " "they do not use 3 independent relays." msgstr "" #. type: Content of:

            msgid "" "End-to-end correlation attacks have been studied in research papers, but we " "don't know of any actual use to deanonymize Tor users. For an example, see " "Murdoch and Zieliński: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level " "Adversaries." msgstr ""