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#. type: Content of: <div>
#, read-only
msgid "[[!meta title=\"Limitations of the Tor network\"]]"
msgstr "[[!meta title=\"Limitations of the Tor network\"]]"

#. type: Content of: <h1>
#, read-only
msgid "Limitations of Tor"
msgstr "Limitations of Tor"

#. type: Content of: <div>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"[[!inline pages=\"doc/about/warning/tor.inline\" raw=\"yes\" sort=\"age\"]] "
"[[!toc levels=2]]"
msgstr ""
"[[!inline pages=\"doc/about/warning/tor.inline\" raw=\"yes\" sort=\"age\"]] "
"[[!toc levels=2]]"

#. type: Content of: <h2>
#, read-only
msgid "Tails makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails"
msgstr "Tails makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails"

#. type: Content of: <p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"Everything you do on the Internet from Tails goes through the Tor network."
msgstr ""
"Everything you do on the Internet from Tails goes through the Tor network."

#. type: Content of: <p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"Tor and Tails don't protect you by making you look like any random Internet "
"user, but by making all Tor and Tails users look the same. It becomes "
"impossible to know who is who among all users."
msgstr ""
"Tor and Tails don't protect you by making you look like any random Internet "
"user, but by making all Tor and Tails users look the same. It becomes "
"impossible to know who is who among all users."

#. type: Content of: <ul><li><p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"Your Internet service provider (ISP) and local network can see that you "
"connect to the Tor network. But, they cannot know which sites you visit.  To "
"also hide that you connect to Tor, use a "
"[[Tor bridge|doc/anonymous_internet/tor]]."
msgstr ""
"Your Internet service provider (ISP) and local network can see that you "
"connect to the Tor network. But, they cannot know which sites you visit.  To "
"also hide that you connect to Tor, use a "
"[[Tor bridge|doc/anonymous_internet/tor]]."

#. type: Content of: <ul><li><p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"The sites that you visit can know that you are using Tor, because the <a "
"href=\"https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html\">list of exit nodes "
"of the Tor network</a> is public."
msgstr ""
"The sites that you visit can know that you are using Tor, because the <a "
"href=\"https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html\">list of exit nodes "
"of the Tor network</a> is public."

#. type: Content of: <div><p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"Parental controls, Internet service providers, and countries with heavy "
"censorship can identify and block connections to the Tor network that don't "
"use Tor bridges."
msgstr ""
"Parental controls, Internet service providers, and countries with heavy "
"censorship can identify and block connections to the Tor network that don't "
"use Tor bridges."

#. type: Content of: <div><p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"Many websites ask you to solve a CAPTCHA or block access from the Tor "
"network."
msgstr ""
"Many websites ask you to solve a CAPTCHA or block access from the Tor "
"network."

#. type: Content of: <h2>
#, read-only
msgid "Exit nodes can intercept traffic to the destination server"
msgstr "Exit nodes can intercept traffic to the destination server"

#. type: Content of: <p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"Tor hides your location from destination servers, but it does not encrypt "
"<i>all</i> your communication. The last relay of a Tor circuit, called the "
"<i>exit node</i>, establishes the actual connection to the destination "
"server. This last step can be unencrypted, for example, if you connect to a "
"website using HTTP instead of HTTPS."
msgstr ""
"Tor hides your location from destination servers, but it does not encrypt "
"<i>all</i> your communication. The last relay of a Tor circuit, called the "
"<i>exit node</i>, establishes the actual connection to the destination "
"server. This last step can be unencrypted, for example, if you connect to a "
"website using HTTP instead of HTTPS."

#. type: Content of: outside any tag (error?)
#, read-only
msgid ""
"[[!img doc/anonymous_internet/tor/tor.svg size=\"600x\" link=\"no\" alt=\"A "
"Tor connection goes through 3 relays with the last one establishing the "
"actual connection to the final destination\"]]"
msgstr ""
"[[!img doc/anonymous_internet/tor/tor.svg size=\"600x\" link=\"no\" alt=\"A "
"Tor connection goes through 3 relays with the last one establishing the "
"actual connection to the final destination\"]]"

#. type: Content of: <p>
#, read-only
msgid "The exit node can:"
msgstr "The exit node can:"

#. type: Content of: <ul><li><p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"Observe your traffic. That is why <i>Tor Browser</i> and Tails include tools "
"to encrypt the connection between the exit node and the destination server, "
"whenever possible."
msgstr ""
"Observe your traffic. That is why <i>Tor Browser</i> and Tails include tools "
"to encrypt the connection between the exit node and the destination server, "
"whenever possible."

#. type: Content of: <ul><li><p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"Pretend to be the destination server, a technique known as <i>machine-in-the-"
"middle</i> attack (MitM). That is why you should pay even more attention to "
"the security warnings in <i>Tor Browser</i>. If you get such a warning, use "
"the [[New Identity|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#new-identity]] feature "
"of <i>Tor Browser</i> to change exit node."
msgstr ""
"Pretend to be the destination server, a technique known as <i>machine-in-the-"
"middle</i> attack (MitM). That is why you should pay even more attention to "
"the security warnings in <i>Tor Browser</i>. If you get such a warning, use "
"the [[New Identity|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#new-identity]] feature "
"of <i>Tor Browser</i> to change exit node."

#. type: Content of: <ul>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"[[!img ssl_warning.png link=\"no\" alt="
"\"Warning: Potential Security Risk Ahead\"]]"
msgstr ""
"[[!img ssl_warning.png link=\"no\" alt="
"\"Warning: Potential Security Risk Ahead\"]]"

#. type: Content of: <p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"To learn more about what information is available to someone observing the "
"different parts of a Tor circuit, see the interactive graphics at [[Tor "
"Support: How HTTPS encryption and Tor works in Tor Browser to enhance your "
"privacy and anonymity|https://support.torproject.org/about-tor/security/"
"https-encryption-and-tor/]]."
msgstr ""
"To learn more about what information is available to someone observing the "
"different parts of a Tor circuit, see the interactive graphics at [[Tor "
"Support: How HTTPS encryption and Tor works in Tor Browser to enhance your "
"privacy and anonymity|https://support.torproject.org/about-tor/security/"
"https-encryption-and-tor/]]."

#. type: Content of: <div><p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"Tor exit nodes have been used in the past to collect sensitive information "
"from unencrypted connections. Malicious exit nodes are regularly identified "
"and removed from the Tor network. For an example, see <a href=\"https://"
"arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/09/"
"security-expert-used-tor-to-collect-government-e-mail-passwords/\">Ars "
"Technica: Security expert used Tor to collect government e-mail "
"passwords</a>."
msgstr ""
"Tor exit nodes have been used in the past to collect sensitive information "
"from unencrypted connections. Malicious exit nodes are regularly identified "
"and removed from the Tor network. For an example, see <a href=\"https://"
"arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/09/"
"security-expert-used-tor-to-collect-government-e-mail-passwords/\">Ars "
"Technica: Security expert used Tor to collect government e-mail "
"passwords</a>."

#. type: Content of: <h2>
#, read-only
msgid "Adversaries watching both ends of a Tor circuit could identify users"
msgstr "Adversaries watching both ends of a Tor circuit could identify users"

#. type: Content of: <p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"An adversary, who could control the 3 relays in a circuit, could deanonymize "
"Tor users."
msgstr ""
"An adversary, who could control the 3 relays in a circuit, could deanonymize "
"Tor users."

#. type: Content of: <div><p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"Tor chooses 3 relays that belong to 3 different network operators for each "
"circuit."
msgstr ""
"Tor chooses 3 relays that belong to 3 different network operators for each "
"circuit."

#. type: Content of: <div><p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"Tails takes extra measures to [[use different circuits for different "
"applications|contribute/design/stream_isolation]]."
msgstr ""
"Tails takes extra measures to [[use different circuits for different "
"applications|contribute/design/stream_isolation]]."

#. type: Content of: <div><p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"The Tor network has more than 6&#8239;000 relays. Organizations running Tor "
"relays include universities like the MIT, activist groups like Riseup, "
"nonprofits like Derechos Digitales, Internet hosting companies like Private "
"Internet Access, and so on. The huge diversity of people and organizations "
"running Tor relays makes it more secure and more sustainable."
msgstr ""
"The Tor network has more than 6&#8239;000 relays. Organizations running Tor "
"relays include universities like the MIT, activist groups like Riseup, "
"nonprofits like Derechos Digitales, Internet hosting companies like Private "
"Internet Access, and so on. The huge diversity of people and organizations "
"running Tor relays makes it more secure and more sustainable."

#. type: Content of: <p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"A powerful adversary, who could analyze the timing and shape of the traffic "
"entering and exiting the Tor network, might be able to deanonymize Tor "
"users.  These attacks are called <i>end-to-end correlation</i> attacks, "
"because the attacker has to observe both ends of a Tor circuit at the same "
"time."
msgstr ""
"A powerful adversary, who could analyze the timing and shape of the traffic "
"entering and exiting the Tor network, might be able to deanonymize Tor "
"users.  These attacks are called <i>end-to-end correlation</i> attacks, "
"because the attacker has to observe both ends of a Tor circuit at the same "
"time."

#. type: Content of: <p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"No anonymity network used for rapid connections, like browsing the web or "
"instant messaging, can protect 100% from end-to-end correlation attacks. In "
"this case, VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) are less secure than Tor, because "
"they do not use 3 independent relays."
msgstr ""
"No anonymity network used for rapid connections, like browsing the web or "
"instant messaging, can protect 100% from end-to-end correlation attacks. In "
"this case, VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) are less secure than Tor, because "
"they do not use 3 independent relays."

#. type: Content of: <div><p>
#, read-only
msgid ""
"End-to-end correlation attacks have been studied in research papers, but we "
"don't know of any actual use to deanonymize Tor users. For an example, see "
"<a href=\"https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/murdoch-pet2007.pdf\""
">Murdoch and Zieliński: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level "
"Adversaries</a>."
msgstr ""
"End-to-end correlation attacks have been studied in research papers, but we "
"don't know of any actual use to deanonymize Tor users. For an example, see "
"<a href=\"https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/murdoch-pet2007.pdf\""
">Murdoch and Zieliński: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level "
"Adversaries</a>."
