en	[[!meta title="Frequently asked questions"]]

en	For hardware compatibility issues, refer to our [[known issues|support/known_issues]].

en	To learn what you can do with Tails, refer to our [[documentation|doc]].

en	For questions related to Tor, see also to the [Tor support pages](https://support.torproject.org/).

en	Tails project

en	What is the relationship between Tor and Tails?

en	Tails is part of the [Tor Project](https://torproject.org/).

en	Tails [[was founded|news/celebrating_10_years]] in 2009 and [[joined forces with Tor|news/tails_tor]] in 2024.

en	See also our explanation about [[why Tails uses Tor|doc/anonymous_internet/tor/why#relationship]].

en	Why is Tails based on Debian and not on another distribution?

en	We are deeply rooted and involved in Debian. The friendships, relationships, and technical expertise we have in Debian have many benefits for Tails, and we are not ready to build the same relationship with Ubuntu, OpenBSD, or any other distribution. See our statement about our [[contribute/relationship_with_upstream]] for details.

en	See also the article [Why there are so many Debian derivatives](http://upsilon.cc/~zack/blog/posts/2011/09/why_there_are_so_many_debian_derivatives/) by Stefano Zacchiroli.

en	Why isn't Tails based on Ubuntu?

en	First, see the answer to the [[previous question|faq#debian]].

en	The rapid development cycle of Ubuntu would be too fast for Tails.

en	Ubuntu adds features in ways that we find dangerous for privacy. For an example, see [EFF: Privacy in Ubuntu 12.10, Amazon Ads and Data Leaks](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/privacy-ubuntu-1210-amazon-ads-and-data-leaks).

en	Ubuntu is led by [Canonical](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canonical_\(company\)), a for-profit corporation that takes most of the important decisions.

en	We usually ship kernels and video drivers from [Debian backports](http://backports.debian.org/). The result is comparable to Ubuntu in terms of support for recent hardware.

en	We think that the general quality of the maintenance work being done on packages matters from a security perspective. Debian maintainers generally are experts in the fields their packages deal with; while it is generally not the case outside of the limited number of packages Ubuntu officially supports.

en	Why does Tails ship the GNOME Desktop?

en	People have asked for Tails with LXDE, XFCE, MATE, KDE, and so on, but we are not going to use a different desktop.

en	The main drawback of GNOME is that it requires quite a lot of resources, but GNOME has many advantages, especially for users who are new to Linux.

en	The GNOME desktop is:

en	Well integrated

en	Very well translated

en	Doing relatively well in terms of accessibility features

en	Actively developed

en	Well maintained in Debian, where it is the default desktop

en	We invested quite some time in acquiring GNOME knowledge, and switching our desktop environment would require going through that process again.

en	That's also why we are not going to provide more than one desktop option.

en	Installation

en	Do I need a USB stick dedicated to Tails?

en	Yes. Tails requires a USB stick dedicated to running Tails only.

en	If it were possible to use the same USB stick with another operating system, for example to store files to use on Windows, a virus in the other operating system could corrupt your Tails.

en	That's why your Tails USB stick is not recognized in Windows and why we discourage installing other live operating systems on the same USB stick.

en	To store files in your Tails USB stick, use the [[Persistent Storage|doc/persistent_storage]]. To exchange files between Tails and another operating system, use a separate USB stick.

en	Can I install Tails permanently onto my hard disk?

en	This is not possible using the recommended installation methods. Tails is designed to be a live system running from a removable media: USB stick or DVD.

en	This is a conscious decision as this mode of operation is better for what we want to provide to Tails users: amnesia, the fact that Tails leaves no traces on the computer after a session is closed.

en	Can I install Tails with UNetbootin, YUMI, Ventoy, or another tool?

en	No. Those installation methods are unsupported. They might not work at all, or worse: they might seem to work, but produce a USB stick that does *not* behave like Tails should. Follow the [[download and installation documentation|install]] instead.

en	Should I update Tails using apt upgrade or Synaptic?

en	No. Upgrading whenever you get a notification from *[[Tails Upgrader|doc/upgrade]]* is enough.

en	Tails provides upgrades every 4 weeks, which are thoroughly tested to make sure that no security feature or configuration gets broken.

en	If you upgrade the system yourself using `apt` or *Synaptic*, you might break things.

en	Our team sometimes publishes emergency releases, whenever important security upgrades are available in Debian or *Tor Browser* before the next scheduled release.

en	Can I buy a preinstalled Tails USB stick or DVD?

en	No, we don't sell preinstalled Tails devices.

en	Selling preinstalled devices would in fact be a pretty bad idea:

en	If burned on a DVD, then this DVD would be outdated on the next release. This means after 4 weeks at most.

en	If installed onto a USB stick, then it would be impossible to verify that the Tails on the USB stick is genuine. Trusting that a Tails USB stick is genuine should be based either on cryptographic verification or on personal trust (if you know someone you trust who can clone a Tails USB stick for you). But once Tails is installed on a USB stick it is not possible to use our cryptographic verification techniques anymore. Being able to trust your Tails USB stick is something that we really care about.

en	Can I verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD?

en	It is impossible to verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick or DVD while running Tails from it. It would be like asking someone whether they are lying: a true liar would always pretend to tell the truth.

en	If you worry that your Tails might be corrupted, do a [[manual upgrade|doc/upgrade]] from a trusted operating system to upgrade it to a trusted version of Tails.

en	In the future, we might make it possible to verify the integrity of a Tails USB stick from another trusted OS. ([[!tails_ticket 7496]])

en	Tor Browser

en	Why is JavaScript enabled by default in Tor Browser?

en	Many websites today require JavaScript to work correctly. As a consequence JavaScript is enabled by default in Tails to avoid confusing many users. But *Tor Browser* takes care of [[blocking dangerous JavaScript functionalities|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#javascript]].

en	Tor Browser also includes a [[security level|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#security-level]] and the [[NoScript|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#noscript]] extension to optionally disable more JavaScript. This might improve security in some cases. However, if you disable JavaScript, then the [[fingerprint|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]] of your *Tor Browser* differs from most users. This reduces your anonymity.

en	We think that having JavaScript enabled by default is the best possible compromise between usability and security in this case.

en	We have plans to allow storing the security level in the Persistent Storage. ([[!tails_ticket 9700]])

en	Can I install other add-ons in Tor Browser?

en	Installing add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built into Tails.

en	Add-ons can do many things within the browser, and even if all the networking goes through Tor, some add-ons might interact badly with the rest of the configuration or leak private information.

en	1. They can track and reveal information about your browsing behaviour, browsing history, or system information, either on purpose or by mistake.

en	2. They can have bugs and security vulnerabilities that can be remotely exploited by an attacker.

en	3. They can have bugs that break the security offered by other add-ons and break your anonymity.

en	4. They can break your anonymity by making your browsing behaviour distinguishable from other Tails users.

en	Unless proven otherwise, no add-on, apart from the ones already included in Tails, has been seriously audited and should be considered safe to use in this context.

en	[[Browsing the web with Tor Browser|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser]]

en	Should I manually update add-ons included in Tor Browser?

en	No.

en	Updating add-ons in *Tor Browser* might break the security built into Tails.

en	How to analyse the results of online anonymity tests?

en	Fingerprinting websites, such as <https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/>, try to retrieve as much information as possible from your browser to see if it can be used to identify you.

en	As explained in our documentation about [[the fingerprint of *Tor Browser* in Tails|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity by making it difficult to distinguish you from other users of *Tor Browser* (either in Tails or on other operating systems).

en	So, the information retrieved by such fingerprinting websites is not harmful for anonymity in itself, as long as it is the same for all users of *Tor Browser*.

en	Furthermore, we verify the result of those websites before each release, see our [[test suite|contribute/release_process/test]].

en	Networking

en	Can I use Tails with a VPN?

en	Currently, Tails does not work with VPNs.

en	Tor provides anonymity by making it impossible for a single point in the network to know both the origin and destination of a connection.

en	[[!img doc/anonymous_internet/tor/tor.png link="no" class="svg" alt="A Tor connection goes through 3 relays with the last one establishing the actual connection to the final destination"]]

en	Unlike Tor, VPNs don't provide strong anonymity because the VPN provider can see both where you are connecting from and where you are connecting to.

en	[[!img doc/anonymous_internet/tor/vpn.png link="no" class="svg" alt="A VPN connection goes through a single relay"]]

en	But VPNs have clear benefits over Tor in some situations where strong anonymity is not needed, for example:

en	To access websites that block Tor or can only be accessed from a given country

en	To use videoconferencing tools like *Jitsi* or *Zoom*

en	To access private VPN services like intranets or share folders

en	To browse the Internet at higher speeds than Tor

en	We are now considering adding VPN support to Tails, either:

en	By adding another browser that would use a VPN instead of Tor. ([[!tails_ticket 19465]] or [[!tails_ticket 19942]])

en	By giving the option to use a VPN instead of Tor for the whole system and still having Tor Browser to use Tor only ([[!tails_ticket 19901]])

en	For more information, see our [[!tails_blueprint desc="blueprint on VPN support" VPN-support]].

en	Can I choose the country of my exit nodes or further edit the torrc?

en	Editing the Tor configuration file, also called `torrc`, to modify how Tor creates circuits can weaken your anonymity in ways that are hard to understand and explain. That is why we don't explain how to modify the Tor configuration file in Tails, for example, to choose the country of your exit nodes or exclude some entry guards.

en	Still, you can close a given circuit and trigger Tor to create a new one using the [[New Tor circuit for this site|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser]] button of *Tor Browser* or the [[*Onion Circuits*|doc/anonymous_internet/tor/circuits]] utility.

en	Why does Tails automatically connect to websites when starting?

en	The clock of the computer needs to be set at the correct time for both:

en	Being able to connect to the Tor network.

en	The computer clock is fixed a first time, approximately, before connecting to Tor, either [[automatically|doc/anonymous_internet/tor#automatic]] or [[manually|doc/anonymous_internet/tor/troubleshoot#clock]].

en	Protecting your anonymity while using Tor.

en	The computer clock is fixed a second time, precisely, to prevent a website from identifying you by analyzing minor differences between your computer clock and the correct time.

en	This second synchronization is made by sending HTTPS queries through Tor to several websites and deducing a correct time from their answers. You can see the list of websites that Tails can connect to in *[[!tails_gitweb config/chroot_local-includes/etc/default/htpdate.pools desc="/etc/default/htpdate.pools"]]*.

en	See also our [[design document on time synchronization|contribute/design/Time_syncing]].

en	Can I help the Tor network by running a relay or a bridge in Tails?

en	It is currently impossible to run a Tor relay or bridge in Tails.

en	Can I run a Tor onion service from Tails?

en	You can use [[*OnionShare*|doc/anonymous_internet/onionshare]] to share files, websites, and chat rooms from Tails using onion services.

en	It is technically possible to use Tails to create other onion services, but it is complicated and we have no plans to document this.

en	Can I use ping in Tails?

en	It is impossible to use `ping` in Tails, because `ping` uses the ICMP protocol while Tor can only transport TCP connections.

en	Included software

en	Can my favorite software be included in Tails?

en	If a software is not included in Tails, but is included in Debian, you can use the [[Additional Software|doc/persistent_storage/configure#additional_software]] feature of the Persistent Storage to install it automatically every time you start Tails.

en	First, make sure that this software is already available in Debian, as this is a requirement to be included in Tails.

en	Adding to Tails software that is not in Debian implies extra work that could compromise the sustainability of the project.

en	Being in Debian brings many advantages:

en	It is included in the Debian process for security updates and new versions.

en	It is authenticated using OpenPGP signatures.

en	It is under the scrutiny of the Debian community and its many users and derivatives, including Ubuntu.

en	To check whether some software is in Debian, search for it on <https://packages.debian.org/>. If it is not yet available in Debian, ask its developers why it is not the case yet.

en	Second, this software might not be useful to accomplish our design goals. Refer to our [[design documents|contribute/design]] to understand which are the intended use cases, and the assumptions on which Tails is based.

en	We also try to limit the amount of software included in Tails, and we only add new software with a very good reason to do so:

en	We try to limit the growth of the images and automatic upgrades.

en	More software implies more security issues.

en	We avoid proposing several options to accomplish the same task.

en	If a package needs to be removed after its inclusion, for example because of security problems, then this might be problematic as users might rely on it.

en	After considering all this, if you still think that this software is a good candidate to be included in Tails, please explain us your proposal on [[!tails_ticket desc="GitLab"]].

en	Here is some of the software we are often asked to include in Tails:

en	**monero**: not in Debian ([[!tails_ticket 17823]])

en	**bitmessage**: not in Debian

en	**retroshare**: not in Debian

en	**rar/unrar**: not [[Free Software|doc/about/license]]

en	Can I use messaging apps like WhatsApp, Telegram, or Signal in Tails?

en	Adding [*Signal*](https://signal.org/) is very high in our priorities but complicated because *Signal* is not available in Debian by default and updates very often.

en	Because no single app will ever meet the needs of all our users, we might also make it easier to install other messaging apps. ([[!tails_ticket 14567]])

en	In Tails, you can already chat over XMPP using [[Pidgin|doc/anonymous_internet/pidgin]] and create anonymous chat rooms using [[OnionShare|doc/anonymous_internet/onionshare]].

en	Current alternatives:

en	**Signal**

en	You can follow this tutorial to [install *Signal Desktop* on Tails](https://0xacab.org/about.privacy/messengers-on-tails-os/-/wikis/Signal/Install-Signal-desktop) and link to an existing *Signal* account.

en	To create a *Signal* account for a new telephone number from Tails, follow this tutorial on [registering an account using `signal-cli`](https://0xacab.org/about.privacy/messengers-on-tails-os/-/wikis/Signal/Registration-and-Provisioning-via-signal-cli).

en	**WhatsApp**

en	*WhatsApp Web* works in *Tor Browser* as of January 2025. *WhatsApp Web* has been unreliable in *Tor Browser* in the past and might stop working in the future.

en	**Telegram Web**

en	*Telegram Web* does not work in *Tor Browser* as of January 2025. *Telegram Web* has been working in *Tor Browser* in the past and might work again in the future.

en	Can I do voice or video calls from Tails?

en	Not yet.

en	Videoconferencing tools that work in web browsers, like *Jitsi* or *Zoom*, don't work in *Tor Browser* yet.

en	They rely on the [[!wikipedia WebRTC]] technology, which uses [[!wikipedia User_Datagram_Protocol desc="UDP"]] connections. But, the Tor network only supports TCP connections, like the ones used for HTTP and email.

en	To remove this limitation, the Tor Project is working on [supporting UDP traffic over Tor](https://spec.torproject.org/proposals/339-udp-over-tor.htm).

en	Proprietary applications like *Skype* or *Zoom* will never be available in Tails because they are not Free Software.

en	[*Mumble*](https://www.mumble.info/) is the only voice chat application that we know works from Tails. You can use the [[Additional Software|doc/persistent_storage/additional_software]] feature to add *Mumble* to your Tails.

en	[*Wahay*](https://wahay.org/) is a decentralized voice chat application based on *Mumble*. If you are a Debian developer, please help us [[!tails_ticket 17617 desc="get *Wahay* in Debian"]].

en	Can I download using BitTorrent with Tails?

en	Tails does not ship any BitTorrent software and is unlikely to do so in the future.

en	There are 2 problems with using BitTorrent over Tor:

en	It is technically hard to do it properly, see: <https://blog.torproject.org/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea>.

en	It harms the network, see: <https://blog.torproject.org/why-tor-slow-and-what-were-going-do-about-it>.

en	Can I use Monero in Tails?

en	Yes. You can install the [[*Feather*|doc/advanced_topics/feather]] Monero wallet as an AppImage.

en	Tails currently does not include a Monero wallet. However, we are interested in making it easier to use Monero in Tails in the future. See [[!tails_ticket 17823]] for a list of unofficial guides on how to use Monero in Tails.

en	Does Tails need an antivirus?

en	No, as other Linux systems, Tails doesn't require an antivirus to protect itself from most malware, such as viruses, trojans, and worms. There are various reasons why Linux operating systems generally don't need antivirus software, including the permission design of Linux systems.

en	See the [[!wikipedia Linux_malware desc="Wikipedia page on Linux malware"]] for further details.

en	Why does Tails include old versions of software?

en	The Tails 7 series is based on Debian 13 (Trixie).

en	The version of each application included in Tails corresponds to the version available in this version of Debian. Even though some versions might be old, the [Debian Security Team](https://wiki.debian.org/Teams/Security) provides security updates.

en	Newer versions of all applications will be available starting from Tails 7.0, which will be based on Debian 13 (Trixie). Until then, you cannot update any of the applications included in Tails to a newer version.

en	You can see which version of a software package is available in each version of Debian on <https://packages.debian.org/>.