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#. type: Content of: <div>
msgid "[[!meta title=\"Limitations of the Tor network\"]]"
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <h1>
msgid "Limitations of Tor"
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <div>
msgid ""
"[[!inline pages=\"doc/about/warning/tor.inline\" raw=\"yes\" sort=\"age\"]] "
"[[!toc levels=2]]"
msgstr ""
"[[!inline pages=\"doc/about/warning/tor.inline.id\" raw=\"yes\" "
"sort=\"age\"]] [[!toc levels=2]]"

#. type: Content of: <h2>
msgid "Tails makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails"
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <p>
msgid ""
"Everything you do on the Internet from Tails goes through the Tor network."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <p>
msgid ""
"Tor and Tails don't protect you by making you look like any random Internet "
"user, but by making all Tor and Tails users look the same. It becomes "
"impossible to know who is who among all users."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <ul><li><p>
msgid ""
"Your Internet service provider (ISP) and local network can see that you "
"connect to the Tor network. But, they cannot know which sites you visit.  To "
"also hide that you connect to Tor, use a [[Tor bridge|doc/anonymous_internet/"
"tor]]."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <ul><li><p>
msgid ""
"The sites that you visit can know that you are using Tor, because the <a "
"href=\"https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html\">list of exit nodes "
"of the Tor network</a> is public."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <div><p>
msgid ""
"Parental controls, Internet service providers, and countries with heavy "
"censorship can identify and block connections to the Tor network that don't "
"use Tor bridges."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <div><p>
msgid ""
"Many websites ask you to solve a CAPTCHA or block access from the Tor "
"network."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <h2>
msgid "Exit nodes can intercept traffic to the destination server"
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <p>
msgid ""
"Tor hides your location from destination servers, but it does not encrypt "
"<i>all</i> your communication. The last relay of a Tor circuit, called the "
"<i>exit node</i>, establishes the actual connection to the destination "
"server. This last step can be unencrypted, for example, if you connect to a "
"website using HTTP instead of HTTPS."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: outside any tag (error?)
msgid ""
"[[!img doc/anonymous_internet/tor/tor.svg size=\"600x\" link=\"no\" alt=\"A "
"Tor connection goes through 3 relays with the last one establishing the "
"actual connection to the final destination\"]]"
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <p>
msgid "The exit node can:"
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <ul><li><p>
msgid ""
"Observe your traffic. That is why <i>Tor Browser</i> and Tails include tools "
"to encrypt the connection between the exit node and the destination server, "
"whenever possible."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <ul><li><p>
msgid ""
"Pretend to be the destination server, a technique known as <i>machine-in-the-"
"middle</i> attack (MitM). That is why you should pay even more attention to "
"the security warnings in <i>Tor Browser</i>. If you get such a warning, use "
"the [[New Identity|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser#new-identity]] feature "
"of <i>Tor Browser</i> to change exit node."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <ul>
msgid ""
"[[!img ssl_warning.png link=\"no\" alt=\"Warning: Potential Security Risk "
"Ahead\"]]"
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <p>
msgid ""
"To learn more about what information is available to someone observing the "
"different parts of a Tor circuit, see the interactive graphics at [[Tor "
"Support: How HTTPS encryption and Tor works in Tor Browser to enhance your "
"privacy and anonymity|https://support.torproject.org/about-tor/security/"
"https-encryption-and-tor/]]."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <div><p>
msgid ""
"Tor exit nodes have been used in the past to collect sensitive information "
"from unencrypted connections. Malicious exit nodes are regularly identified "
"and removed from the Tor network. For an example, see <a href=\"https://"
"arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/09/security-expert-used-tor-to-"
"collect-government-e-mail-passwords/\">Ars Technica: Security expert used "
"Tor to collect government e-mail passwords</a>."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <h2>
msgid "Adversaries watching both ends of a Tor circuit could identify users"
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <p>
msgid ""
"An adversary, who could control the 3 relays in a circuit, could deanonymize "
"Tor users."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <div><p>
msgid ""
"Tor chooses 3 relays that belong to 3 different network operators for each "
"circuit."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <div><p>
msgid ""
"Tails takes extra measures to [[use different circuits for different "
"applications|contribute/design/stream_isolation]]."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <div><p>
msgid ""
"The Tor network has more than 6&#8239;000 relays. Organizations running Tor "
"relays include universities like the MIT, activist groups like Riseup, "
"nonprofits like Derechos Digitales, Internet hosting companies like Private "
"Internet Access, and so on. The huge diversity of people and organizations "
"running Tor relays makes it more secure and more sustainable."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <p>
msgid ""
"A powerful adversary, who could analyze the timing and shape of the traffic "
"entering and exiting the Tor network, might be able to deanonymize Tor "
"users.  These attacks are called <i>end-to-end correlation</i> attacks, "
"because the attacker has to observe both ends of a Tor circuit at the same "
"time."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <p>
msgid ""
"No anonymity network used for rapid connections, like browsing the web or "
"instant messaging, can protect 100% from end-to-end correlation attacks. In "
"this case, VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) are less secure than Tor, because "
"they do not use 3 independent relays."
msgstr ""

#. type: Content of: <div><p>
msgid ""
"End-to-end correlation attacks have been studied in research papers, but we "
"don't know of any actual use to deanonymize Tor users. For an example, see "
"<a href=\"https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/murdoch-"
"pet2007.pdf\">Murdoch and Zieliński: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-"
"Exchange-Level Adversaries</a>."
msgstr ""
